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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
Banks- Corporations: Consolidation and Merger-BANK MAY USE
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM PRIOR CONTACTS
WITH TARGET COMPANY TO EVALUATE TAKEOVER LOAN
Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp.,
602 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1979)
Using cash tender offers, corporations have taken advantage
of the depressed stock prices of the past few years to expand by
acquisition rather than internal expansion.' Few corporations
have sufficient ready cash to purchase a controlling interest in the
target company; they often turn to commercial banks to obtain
financing.2 Banks are occasionally asked to finance the hostile
takeover of another corporate customer.3 The target customers,
in attempts to stave off hostile takeovers, have argued that banks
receiving confidential financial information in connection with a
commercial loan agreement may not finance the hostile takeover
of that customer. Alternatively, target customers argue that banks
may not use the confidential information when deciding whether
to finance the takeover.
In Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp.,4 the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a commercial bank that had received
confidential inforrmation from a corporate customer in connection
with a loan agreement was not precluded from financing the hos-
tile takeover of that customer. 5 Moreover, the court held that the
bank's loan department would breach no duty in its active use of
confidential financial information received from the target when
evaluating a loan to the offeror.6 This Note examines the condi-
tions under which a bank may finance the hostile takeover of a
corporate customer. Although no per se fiduciary duty should
preclude a bank from financing the involuntary takeover of a
corporate customer, a fiduciary duty or an implied contract right
I See Much, Price Adequacy in Hostile Takeovers, National L.J., Dec. 10, 1979, at 21.
2 See Cole, Role of Banks Challenged in Unfriendly Takeovers, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1979,
§ D, at 1, col. 1; Note, Bank Financing of Involuntary Takeovers of Corporate Customers: A
Breach of Fiduciary Duty?, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 827, 827 (1978).
' See Cole, supra note 2.
4 602 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1979).
5 Id. at 601.
6 Id. at 604.
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should prevent the bank from using confidential information
supplied by the target when deciding whether to finance an in-
voluntary takeover.
BACKGROUND
No state or federal statute prohibits a bank from financing
the involuntary takeover of a corporate customer. 7 Targets have
argued, however, that banks breach a common law fiduciary duty
by financing hostile takeover attempts.
In the only case prior to Washington to consider the issues,8
American Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust
Company of Chicago,9 the court held that a bank may make a loan
to facilitate the takeover of a corporate customer if it does not
rely on confidential information provided by the target in evaluat-
ing the loan.' 0 The defendant bank had requested and received
confidential financial information from Medicorp incident to a
loan agreement. The following year, the defendant agreed to
bankroll Humana, Inc. in its attempt to take over Medicorp.
Medicorp sued to enjoin the loan contending that the loan consti-
tuted a breach of the bank's per se fiduciary obligation to
Medicorp. 11 Alternatively, Medicorp argued that a breach of
trust occurred when the bank relied on the confidential informa-
tion in evaluating the loan to Humana.' 2  The court found that
the loan was not a per se violation of trust. 13  The court
suggested, however, that had the bank relied on confidential in-
formation, a proposition unsupported by plaintiff's evidence, the
bank would have breached a duty to Medicorp.' 4
7 See generally Note, supra note 2, at 827.
8 One earlier case involved the same issues, but the parties settled before trial. In
1976, Irving Trust Co. agreed to finance General Cable Corporation's hostile takeover of
Microdot, Inc. At the time, Irving Trust had outstanding loan agreements with both Gen-
eral Cable and Microdot. The takeover was thwarted when Northwest Industries made a
higher offer for Microdot's shares. See Corporate Takeover: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Development, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-6 (1976) (testimony of
Rudolph Eberhart, Jr., President, Microdot, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as Corporate Takeovers];
Cole, supra note 2.
9 475 F. Supp. 5 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
1o Id. at 8.
11Id. at7.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 8.
14 Id.
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II
WASHINGTON STEEL CORP. v. TW CORP.
In 1974, Chemical Bank participated in a credit agreement
with two other banks to loan Washington Steel up to ten million
dollars. Chemical also served as one of two registrars for
Washington Steel's common stock. In connection with the credit
agreement, Washington gave Chemical confidential information,
including a May 1973 study projecting cash flow and earnings as
well as periodic statements of Washington's financial affairs.' 5
Chemical also served as the lead bank in loans to Talley Indus-
tries. In January 1979, Talley decided to acquire Washington and
asked Chemical to help finance the takeover. After performing a
credit analysis of Talley, Chemical assented.' 6
As part of its overall opposition to the offer, Washington's
management sued Talley and Chemical.' 7 Washington obtained
a preliminary injunction upon a district court finding that Chemi-
cal had breached its fiduciary duty to Washington by agreeing to
finance the tender offer. 18
On appeal 19 the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the
bank had not violated any common law fiduciary duty merely by
agreeing to finance the takeover.20 The court stated that such a
per se fiduciary duty was objectionable because it would burden
15 602 F.2d at 596.
16 Id.
1'7 Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 465 F. Supp. 1100 (W.D. Pa.), rev'd, 602 F.2d
594 (3d Cir. 1979).
18 Id. at 1102-05. The court found that Chemical was an agent for both Washington
and Talley, and breached its duty not to act adversely to Washington's interests. The court
also held that Chemical had a duty to disclose all relevant facts so that Washington could
decide whether it should allow a dual agency relationship to continue. The court concluded
that "[t]he balance of hardship under the facts of this case, and in light of the egregious
and unethical conduct of [Chemical], decidedly tips the balance ... in favor of
[Washington] and requires that we grant" the preliminary injunction. Id. at 1105. The
district court apparently based its finding of an agency relationship on Chemical's role as
one of two registrars for Washington's stock and on the receipt of confidential information
in connection with the credit agreement. On appeal, Washington did not rely on Chemi-
cal's role as registrar to support its allegation of a per se fiduciary duty. 602 F.2d at 599.
19 While the appeal was pending, Blount, Inc. offered $40 per share for Washington
Steel's stock and Talley withdrew its offer of $37.50. The court of appeals decided the case
was not moot, however, because Talley and Chemical could sue on the injunction bond and
the court would eventually have to consider the same issues on appeal from the disposition
of the bond claim. 602 F.2d at 598-99.
20 Id. at 599-601.
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the free flow of bank financing and diminish the funds available
for financing corporate ventures.21  On the basis of a cloudy dis-
trict court record, Washington argued that, even absent a per se
duty, Chemical had breached a fiduciary duty by using confiden-
tial information supplied by Washington in evaluating the loan to
Talley. The court, however, refused to impose this duty, even if
Chemical had used confidential information. 22  Such a rule, said
the court, would force banks to enter blindly into loan agreements
or restrict the free flow of bank financing by discouraging banks
from lending money to potential raiders.23 In effect, the court
sanctioned the bank's use of confidential information received
from one borrower in evaluating a loan to another borrower.24
III
A BANK'S DUTY TO CORPORATE BORROWERS
A. The Per Se Fiduciary Duty
Precedent and public policy support the Washington court's
holding that receipt of confidential information from a corporate
borrower does not preclude a bank from financing the hostile
takeover of that borrower. Absent a mutual understanding, no
fiduciary duty should arise from a debtor-creditor relationship.25
21 Id. at 601.
22 Id. at 603.
23 Id. at 601-04.
24 Id. at 604.
25 A fiduciary relation is said to exist whenever one person reposes trust and confi-
dence in the integrity and fidelity of another. The very existence of such a relation pre-
dudes the party in whom the trust and confidence is reposed from profiting by or taking
advantage of the relation at the expense of the other party. See, e.g., Twomey v. Mitchum,
Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 712-17, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222, 238-40 (1968);
South v. Wishard, 146 Cal. App. 2d 276, 284, 303 P.2d 805, 811 (1956). A fiduciary rela-
tion includes all legal relations, such as attorney and client, principal and agent, guardian
and ward, and the like, and also cases where a fiduciary relation exists in fact: where
confidence is reposed on one side and domination and influence result. See, e.g., Finn v.
Monk, 403 Ill. 167, 181, 85 N.E.2d 701, 708 (1949); Clark v. Clark, 398 Il1. 592, 600, 76
N.E.2d 446, 449 (1948).
In Stenberg v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank of Rochester, 307 Minn. 487, 488, 238
N.W.2d 218, 219 (1976), the court held that although the lending bank gave financial
advice to the plaintiff-borrower, no fiduciary relationship arose to replace the normal
commercial relationship between the parties because the plaintiff-borrower was an experi-
enced businessman capable of independent judgment. Similarly, in Umbaugh Pole Bldg.
Co. v. Scott, 58 Ohio St. 282, 390 N.E.2d 320 (1979), the court held that the relationship
of debtor-creditor, without more, is not a fiduciary relationship. The court reasoned that
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As the Washington court noted, one cannot "draw a fiduciary rab-
bit from a commercial loan agreement hat." 2 6  A debtor has no
reasonable basis for the belief that receipt of confidential informa-
tion by a creditor compels the creditor to act in the debtor's in-
terest in all situations.27
A per se rule prohibiting banks from financing hostile
takeovers of corporate customers would "wreak havoc with the
availability of funding for capital ventures."2 8  If banks were pre-
cluded from financing hostile takeovers of corporate customers,
corporations could ensure against hostile takeovers by arranging
loan agreements with the major banks, thereby drying up most
sources of corporate funding.29 Furthermore, potential takeover
targets may encounter difficulties 'obtaining financing from com-
mercial banks if such transactions would preclude the banks from
making larger, more profitable loans to raiders. 30  The Wash-
ington court correctly recognized that such a result "'would tend
to burden the free flow of bank financing and the ability which a
bank now has to deal with customers who may have adverse in-
terests to other customers.' "31
where neither party had, or could have had, a reasonable expectation that the creditor
would act solely or primarily on behalf of the debtor, the creditor's advice to the debtor
did not transform a business relationship into a fiduciary relationship. The creditor and
the debtor dealt with each other at arm's length in a commercial context where each party
protected his own interests. The court noted, however, that a fiduciary relationship may be
created out of an informal relationship if both parties understand that a special trust or
confidence has been reposed. Thus, in Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 49 Ariz. 34, 44, 64
P.2d 101, 106 (1937), the court found that a fiduciary relationship had replaced the
debtor-creditor relationship between a bank and a depositor because the bank had acted as
the depositor's financial advisor for over 23 years and the depositor had relied on that
advice.
21 602 F.2d at 600.
'7 See Herzel & Rosenberg, Loans to Finance Tender Offers: The Bank's Legal Problems, 96
BANK. L.J. 676, 680 (1979). Cf Snow v. Merchants Nat'l Bank of New Bedford, 309 Mass.
354, 360-61, 35 N.E.2d 213, 216-17 (1941) (where bank derived profit from business of
buying and selling securities, plaintiff-customer could not reasonably be of the opinion that
investment advice rendered her was performed by bank acting in fiduciary rather than
business relation).
28 602 F.2d at 601. See also Corporate Takeovers, supra note 8, at 38-39 (testimony of
Gordon T. Wallis, Chairman of the Board, Irving Trust Co.); Note, supra note 2, at 835.
29 602 F.2d at 601; Corporate Takeovers, supra note 8, at 43 (statement of Gordon T.
Wallis, Chairman of the Board, Irving Trust Co.).
30 See Corporate Takeovers, supra note 8, at 43-44 (statement of Gordon T. Wallis,
Chairman of the Board, Irving Trust Co.).
3, 602 F.2d at 601 (quoting American Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental 111. Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 475 F. Supp. 5, 9 (N.D. Ill. 1977)). Such a result might also lead potential raiders
to seek financing from foreign banks not subject to that restriction. See Herzel, Banks,
Mergers, and Conflicts of Interest, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1979, § 3 (Business & Finance), at 20.
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B. The Use of Confidential Information
In contrast, the portion of the Washington court's opinion
dealing with the alleged duty not to use confidential information
is more difficult to support. The court glossed over cogent argu-
ments for finding an implied contractual obligation 32 or a
fiduciary duty based on the debtor's reasonable reliance.3 3 In
counseling banks to use all available information to evaluate loan
transactions, the court ignored the fact that the information's
availability was fortuitous, and inexplicably exalted the interests of
the bank's depositors over those of its debtors. 34
The court couched its hesitation on two grounds. First, such a
rule would "make unwise banking policy" by forcing banks to make
uninformed decisions or alternatively by restricting the free flow
of funds.35  Second, even if the rule's effect was salutary, its crea-
tion was best left to Congress rather than to the states or the fed-
eral judiciary. 6
The court's consideration of banking policy was shortsighted.
Many banks analyze takeover loans on a "worst case" basis 7 _
they focus solely on the borrower's ability to repay if the takeover
is abortive. Even where the target's financial status is relevant-
for example, if the target's stock or assets will serve as collateral
for the loan 38 -the bank can derive most or all of the material
information from the target's press releases, industry reports, and
the target's disclosures pursuant to federal securities regulation.
The modicum of information unavailable from these sources
should be material only in the most marginal of tender offers-
32 See note 44 and accompanying text infra.
s3 See note 43 and accompanying text infra.
34 602 F.2d at 603-04. Cf Corporate Takeovers, supra note 8, at 118 (testimony of Richard
A. Debs, First President and Chief Administrative Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of New
York) (stockholder suit alleging that bank had information in files that acquisition of target
was bad loan but failed to use it "would be thrown out of court").
35 602 F.2d at 603.
36 Id. at 601, 603.
37 Under the worst-case analysis, a bank's principal inquiry in evaluating a loan is
whether the raider has the financial ability to support the transaction by itself: Would the
raider be able to repay the loan in the worst possible situation, e.g., where a raider is
unable to either gain control of the target or sell those shares of the target it does acquire.
The loan decision is based upon consideration of the raider's ability to repay the loan from
its own cash flow, rather than from any assets it may acquire through the acquisition. See
Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,286, at 92,829 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1978); American Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental
Illinois Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, 475 F. Supp. 5, 9 (N.D. 11. 1977).
38 See Herzel, supra note 31.
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offers that banks without access to the target's confidential infor-
mation would refuse to finance. But by funding these marginal
takeovers, the bank tacitly assures the offeror of the soundness of
the acquisition 39--- the target's confidential information is effec-
tively transmitted to third parties.
The court's authorization of the use of "all available informa-
tion" begs the question. 40  Plaintiff in Washington sought to pre-
vent the use of information obtained and obtainable only from
the plaintiff.41 The information was available only because of the
bank's participation in a prior commercial transaction. Surely the
court's opinion could not be extended to authorize the exchange
of confidential information between banks that were not lucky
enough to be privy to the records of particular takeover candi-
dates. 42  A bank that is prevented from using confidential infor-
mation is merely deprived of a fortuitous competitive advantage
in the financial world.
-9 The situation has been analogized to that of the bank bankrolling a blind poker
player.
[A] resourceful fellow [who does riot know the financial condition of the target]
asks his banker to sit in on the game. With his banker at the table looking at his
cards, the blind man offers to bet $425 million on his hand, but only if the
banker will also bet $700 million. When the bank pushes $700 million in chips
to the center of the table, it is fair inference that the blind player has the
benefit of whatever information a view of the cards in his hand would have pro-
vided him in making his bet.
Cole, supra note 2.
40 602 F.2d at 603.
41 Washington's ultimate goal was to defeat Talley's takeover attempt by preventing
Chemical from financing the hostile takeover. The allegation of misuse could be charac-
terized as simply another weapon in the target's armory of takeover defenses. See Herzel &
Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 678; see, e.g., Harnischfeger Corp. v. Poccan, Inc., 474 F.
Supp. 1151 (E.D. Wis. 1979); American Medicorp v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 475 F. Supp. 5 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
42 Banks may not disclose confidential information about customers to third parties.
See, e.g., Milohnich v. First Nat'l Bank of Miami Springs, 224 So. 2d 759, 760 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1969) (bank under implied contractual duty not to disclose information about cus-
tomers' accounts to third parties); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 588,
367 P.2d 284, 290 (1961) (bank liable for breach of implied contract in disclosing informa-
tion concerning customer's account); cf. Peoples Bank of V.I. v. Figueroa, 559 F.2d 914,
916-18 (3d Cir. 1977) (bank not liable for failure to reveal information about borrower to
endorsers); Valley Bank of Nev. v. Superior Ct. of Sap Joaquin City, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 542
P.2d 977, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1975) (before confidential customer information may be
disclosed in civil discovery proceedings, bank must take reasonable steps to notify customer
and afford customer reasonable opportunity to protect his interests). But cf. Graney Dev.
Corp. v. Taksen, 92 Misc. 2d 764, 768, 400 N.Y.S.2d 717, 720 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Co.), aff'd,
66 A.D. 2d 1008, 411 N.Y.S.2d 756 (4th Dep't 1978) (bank not liable for breach of implied
298
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The benefits of the unstaunched flow of information must be
balanced against the target's legitimate interests in the confiden-
tiality of the information. Courts should hold that the target's dis-
closure of confidential information creates a special relationship
which precludes the bank from using the information for its own
purposes and profit. 43  The prohibition against unauthorized use
might also be seen as an implied term of the original agreement. 44
The Washington court's reliance on congressional action in the
field 45 is similarly misplaced. Although the court granted that the
banking area was so vital to the national economy that it de-
manded the creation of uniform federal rules, the court declined
to imply any fiduciary duty in the absence of federal legisla-
tion.46 The congressional and executive action cited by the
court 4 7 supports the court's characterization of the area as one in
which federal regulation is appropriate; legislative inaction on the
contract for disclosing information about borrower which borrower would not normally
expect to be kept confidential). According to Professor David F. Linowes, former chairman
of the Federal Privacy Protection Study Commission, although most owners of small
businesses assume their banking is private between them and their bankers, banks disclose
information about their customers to any creditor who asks. This "erosion of that confiden-
tial relationship" between customers and their bankers often occurs without the customer's
knowledge. A spokesman for the American Bankers Association responded that if a busi-
ness owner lists his bank as a credit reference when applying for credit, he at least im-
plicitly authorizes disclosure of his bank accounts. Commenting on Linowes' study, one
banker stated that banks protect the legitimate privacy of their business customers even
when not required by law, Molotsky, Business-Loan Details Found To Be No Secret, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 1, 1979, § D (Business Day), at 12.
43 See Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc.- L. REP,. (CCH) 96, 286, at 92, 289 ("a special relationship which may be designated
fiduciary or confidential, does exist between a prospective borrower and its bank which
should preclude the bank from disseminating or using the [confidential] information for
improper purposes."); Corporate Takeovers, supra note 8, at 99 (testimony of Richard A.
Debs, First Vice President and Chief Administrative Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of New
York) ("There is a special relationship between banks and their customers that is based on
confidence and trust in the bank itself, and in the bank's commitment to safeguard the
confidencial [sic] affairs of its customers."); id. at 49 (testimony of Gordon T. Wallis,
Chairman of the Board, Irving Trust Co.).44 See American Medicorp v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 475 F. Supp. 5, at
8 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (customary package of confidential documents are presented by prospec-
tive borrower to bank "with the understanding that they would be retained in a confiden-
tial posture within the bank, and also not released to outsiders."). See also Herzel & Rosen-
berg, supra note 27, at 676.
45 602 F.2d at 601. The court made this argument in its discussion of the per se
fiduciary duty and then referred to it as a reason for not promulgating a rule restricting
the use of confidential information.
46 Id. at 603.
47 Id. at 601. The regulations the court referred to involve the dissemination of confi-
dential information between bank departments. See 43 Fed. Reg. 12,755 (1978); Fiduciary
Powers of National Banks and Collective Investment Funds, 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d) (1974).
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very issue before the court, however, may reflect the con-
gressional belief that the court system provided an adequate rem-
edy for *misuse of confidential information. The last time such
legislation was considered, 48 banking industry representatives as-
sured a Senate committee that confidential information was
safeguarded in the context of hostile takeovers 49 and that the
common law and the judicial process afforded sufficient protec-
tion against abuses.50  State common law may well be inappro-
priate to deal with the problem; 51 at the least it provides a model 
52
for the implication of a federal common law duty fit to serve
until Congress enacts a responsive statute 53 .or defers explicitly to
the federal courts.
IV
A PROPOSAL
In the wake of Washington, potential targets may seek explicit
contractual provisions to protect the information disclosed to their
48 See Corporate Takeovers, supra note 8. No legislation resulted from the hearing.
49 See id. at 33-35 (testimony of Gordon T. Wallis, Chairman of the Board, Irving Trust
Co.).
- Richard A. Debs, First Vice President and Chief Administrative Officer, Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York, testified:
The judicial process is available to any party harmed by the action of a bank in
improperly dealing with or otherwise misusing confidential information en-
trusted to it by the aggrieved party. There are no provisions in the banling laws
that apply directly to abuses of this kind. But there are principles of the com-
mon law that could provide remedies for parties harmed by such abuses. The
courts are particularly well equipped to deal with such cases, since they would
presumably involve ... critical findings of fact as to whether confidential in-
formation was indeed misused.
Id. at 99.
51 602 F.2d at 603.
52 See Pigg v. Robertson, 549 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (although relation-
ship between bank and borrower is one of debtor and creditor, the relation may give rise
to a particular obligation such as an obligation not to misuse confidential information re-
ceived from a customer); note 42 supra; cf. Milchnich v. First Nat'l Bank of Miami Springs,
224 So. 2d 759, 760 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (bank is under implied contractual duty not
to disclose information about customer's accounts to third parties); Peterson v. Idaho First
Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 588, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (1961) (bank is liable for breach of
implied contract for disclosing information concerning customer's account); Valley Bank of
Nevada v. Superior Ct. of San Joaquin Cry., 15 Cal. 2d 652, 542 P.2d 977, 125 Cal. Rptr.
553 (1975) (before confidential customer information may be disclosed in civil discovery
proceedings, bank must take reasonable steps to notify customer and afford him reasona-
ble opportunity to take legal action to protect his interests).
53 See [1979] 528 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)'A-18 (July 18, 1979) (Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs is soliciting suggestions for legislation to prevent
misuse of confidential information in connection with tender offers).
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banks.54 In the present tight credit market, however, borrowers
may lack the bargaining power to obtain these provisions. 55 Ab-
sent an express contractual provision, a federal court should
imply a contractual provision forbidding the use of confidential
information or find a fiduciary duty to the same effect. 56
Targets may still face an insurmountable burden in showing
that misuse occurred: the bank's use of confidential information is
"peculiarly within the knowledge of the adversary." 57  Fairness
and convenience argue that the bank should have the initial bur-
den of showing that no abuse occurred. 58  Banks could satisfy this
burden by demonstrating the safeguards they employed to pre-
vent unauthorized access to confidential information. Banks can
effectively prevent misuse of confidential information by design-
ing "Chinese Walls" 59 to isolate lending officers from the target's
5' See Herzel & Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 676 n.1 (bank's legal responsibilities re-
garding use of confidential information can be regulated by contract between bank and
customer) and cases cited therein.
55 Cf. American Medicorp v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 475 F. Supp. 5,
8 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (corporation desiring loan must give confidential information to banks).
6 See notes 43-44 and accompanying text supra.
5 United States v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 355 U.S. 253, 265 n.5 (1957) (ordinary
rule, based upon fairness considerations, does not place upon litigant the burden of prov-
ing facts peculiarly within the knowledge of his opponent).
58 Allocation of the burden should be based upon "experience as to what is convenient,
fair, and good policy." Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. REv.
906, 910-11 (1931). Wigmore states that "in a limited class of cases ... the burden of
proving a fact is said to be put on the party who presumably has peculiar means of knowl-
edge enabling him to prove its falsity if it is false." 9 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2486 (3d ed. 1940).
See United States v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 355 U.S. 253, 256 n.5 (1957) ("The ordi-
nary rule, based on considerations of fairness, does not place the burden upon a litigant of
establishing facts peculiarly within the knowledge of his adversary."); Browzin v. Catholic
Univ. of America, 527 F.2d 843, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (ordinarily, a litigant does not have
the burden of establishing facts peculiarly within the knowledge of the opposing party);
G.E.J. Corp. v. Uraniam Aire, Inc., 311 F.2d 749, 751 (9th Cir. 1962) (generally, party
must establish a fact which is essential to its claim or defense but burden of proving fact is
put on party who presumably has means of knowledge enabling it to prove its falsity if it is
false).
5' A Chinese Wall is a body of rules and procedures designed to control the flow of
information-usually between departments, such as the loan department and the trust de-
partment. It is not a physical barrier, although it may provide for physical separation.
Hermon & Safander, The Commercial Bank Trust Department and the "Wall," 19 B.C. IND. &
COM. L. REv. 21, 31 (1972). The operative theory of a Chinese Wall is that denial of access
to confidential information precludes its misuse. Lipton & Mazur, The Chinese Wall Solution
to the Conflict of Securities Firms, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 459 (1975). See generally Herzel & Col-
ling, The Chinese Wall and Conflict of Interest in Banks, 34 Bus. LAw. 73 (1978).
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files and from other personnel who have dealt with the target.60
Upon a showing that the bank has instituted and followed proce-
dures to prevent the misuse of confidential information, the bur-
den of proving misuse would shift to the target.
The reallocation of burdens would have at least two salutary
effects. Banks would be encouraged to institute procedural safe-
guards as the least onerous means of fending off challenges to
takeover loans. Targets, while still free employ the judicial process
as a defensive tactic,6 1 would have to present a stronger showing
than mere access to the information in order to disrupt the poten-
tial takeover.
Mark Holland
60 Since the isolation would occur within the commercial loan department, tender offer
situations involve special problems not usually encountered when instituting Chinese Walls.
Unlike the situation with a trust department Chinese Wall, it probably is not
possible to have a set of general procedures which would be continously in
place and applicable to all tender offer situations. A separate set of Chinese
Wall rules would probably have to be designed quickly by the bank and its
lawyers to fit each tender offer situation as it arises. Education programs for
lending officers can be very helpful in assuring early recognition of tender
offer problem situations and the quick development of a set of procedures that
is best suited to the facts of the particular problem.
Herzel & Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 679.
The Wall is effective, however, if the final decisionmaker has been isolated from the
confidential information. See Lipton & Mazur, supra note 59, at 467 n.19.
A simple way to accomplish this isolation is to obtain the assistance of a bank
officer who has no prior connection with either customer and who will not be
involved in making the loan. The lending officers making the loan should be
careful to consider only publicly available information about the target com-
pany, and it is best to obtain such public information separately from public
sources and not to use any items from the target company's credit files.
Herzel & Rosenberg, supra note 27 at 679.
61 See note 41 supra.
